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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WARD C. HOLBROOK, and 
MABEL F. HOLBROOK, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
WEBSTER'S, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
ELVIN COON, et ux and et al. 
Defendants, 
and 
LEONARD A. TRIMBLE and 
ALICE TRIMBLE, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 8724 
Respondents agree with the statement of facts as recited 
by appellant with the exception that Elvin Coon was owner 
wherein appellant refers to Coon as builder. Respondents 
Trimble, in open court, without objection by appellant, joined 
in Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and counsel 
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for appellant orally stipulated that no objection would be 
raised to such joinder. 
The motion for summary judgment was based upon 
two grounds: ( l) The appellant failed to file its lien within 
the statutory period of eighty days, and (2) Appellant is 
estopped from asserting its lien, having signed a written 
waiver. It is the contention of respondents that each of 
said grounds supports the judgment. 
I 
LIEN NOT FILED WITHIN STATUTORY PERIOD 
It is conceded that appellant's lien was not filed within 
80 days after the furnishing of the last materials by this 
claimant, but the lien was filed 83 days after the last deliv-
ery. The fact that Coon who built the house was the fee 
owner who executed the notes and mortgages and contracted 
with the materialmen for the furnishing of materials is un-
contraverted. The legislature of the State of Utah has de-
fined Contractors and Subcontractors under Section 38-l-2 
UCA 1953 as follows: 
"Whosoever shall do work or furnish materials 
by contract, express or implied, with the owner, as in 
this chapter provided, shall be deemed an original con-
tractor, and all other persons doing work or furnishing 
materials shall be deemed subcontractors." 
(a) ONE DEALING WITH OWNER IS ORIGINAL 
CONTRACTOR 
Appellant in its lien recognized Coon as the owner 
by characterizing Coon as "Contractor AND Owner". The 
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The statutory definition controls over the public concept of 
what a contractor is. The mere fact that a builder of houses 
is generally referred to as a "contractor" should have no 
effect to supersede the statutory definition of what is meant 
by "contractor" under the particular mechanics lien statute 
in Utah. 
The following cases support this proposition. 
Jordan vs. Natrona Lumber Company, ------------
Wyo. ____________ , 75 Pac. (2d) 378, 385, 
wherein the court said: 
"In Ambrose Mfg. Co. v Gapen, 22 Mo. Appl. 397, 
the Court said: 
'It is contended by appellants that the term orig-
inal contractor, as used in the statute, has reference 
solely to those who may do service, by way of work, 
labor, or superintendence, upon the building. 
'The point is not well taken. It has been specially 
ruled by our Supreme Court, that a material man may 
be an original contractor, and that he is, in fact, such 
contractor, if he furnished the material on a contract 
with the owner. Hearne v Ry. Co. 53 Mo. 324.' 
"Courts in other jurisdictions having similar words 
to construe have taken the same view as that announced 
by the foregoing decisions. See Morris v. Bessemer 
Lumber Co., 217 Ala. 441, 116 So. 528; Gray v. N.M. 
Pumice Stone Co., 15 N.M. 478, 110 P. 603. And in 
Freidenhloom v. Pecos Valley Lumber Co., 35 N.M. 
154, 290 P. 797, 798, the court, discussing who may 
be regarded as 'owner' and 'original contractor' within 
the meaning of those words in the mechanics' lien law 
of that state, said that the word 'owner' means the 
party in interest who is the source of authority for the 
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improvement. One who deals with such a party directly 
is contracting with the 'owner', and is not a subcon-
tractor, but is an 'original contractor'. Albuquerque 
Lumber Co. v. Tomei, 32 N.M. 5, 250 P. 21; Mitchell 
v. McCutcheon, 33 N.M. 78, 260 P. 1086; Boyer v. 
Keller, 258 Ill. 106, 101, N.E. 237, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 
628; Builders' Supply & Coal Co. v. Eggmann, 190 Ill. 
App. 572; Colorado Iron Works v. Rickenberg, 4 Idaho, 
262, 38 P. 651; 18 R.C.L. 'Mechanics' Liens,' par. 39. 
There was no error in the ruling complained of.'" 
Freidenbloom vs Pecos Valley Lumber Company, 
____________ N.M. ____________ , 290 P. 797, 798 
"It means the party in interest who is the source 
of authority for the improvement. One who deals with 
such a party directly is contracting with the 'owner', 
and is not a subcontractor, but is an 'original contractor'. 
Albuquerque Lumber Co. v. Tomei, 32 N.M. 5, 250 
P. 21; Mitchell v. McCutcheon, 33 N.M. 78, 260 P. 
1086; Boyer v. Keller, 258 Ill. 106, 101 N.E. 237, 
Ann. Cas. 1916B, 628; Builders' Supply Co. v. Egg-
mann, 190 Ill. App. 572; Colorado Iron Works v. 
Rickenberg, 5 Idaho, 262, 38 P. 651; 18 R.C.L. 'Me-
chanics' liens,' par. 39. There was no error in the 
ruling complained of." 
Colorado Iron Works vs. Rickenberg, 4 Idaho 262, 38 
P. 651, 652 
"Under the statutes of Idaho, any person contract-
ing directly and exclusively with the owner, and between 
whom and the contractor for the construction of the 
structure there is neither relation of interest nor privity 
of contract, is an original contractor, and as such has 
the 60 days provided in the statute for the filing of his 
notice of lien. In this construction we are in accord 
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with the courts of many states having a statute almost 
identical with ours. Matthews v. Association (Tex. 
Sup.) 19 S.W. ISO; Hearne v. Railway Co., 53 Mo. 
325; Bank v. Dashiell, 25 Grat. 616; Planing Mill Co. 
v. Grams, 72 Wis. 275,89 N.W. 531; Phil. Mech. Liens, 
Sec. 40-42; Jones, Liens, Sec. 1283." 
Stark-Davis Co. v. Lansdon et al, ____________ Ore. ____________ , 
265 P. 792, the first Head Note of which is as follows: 
"Materialman, installing furnace pursuant to nego-
tiations with owner, HELD, as bearing on validity of lien 
subsequently filed, an original contractor, though owner 
had entered into a written contract with another for 
construction of dwelling and furnishing of all material 
therein." 
36 Am. Jur. Mechanics' Liens, Par. 51, IS in part as 
follows: 
"CONTRACTORS AND SUBCONTRACTORS 
DISTINGUISHED. -The principal contractor is one 
standing in direct relation to the proprietor and re-
sponsible to him, permitted by the nature of his contract 
ordinarily to work out the plan thereof by subletting 
to others if he sees fit. He is the person who agrees with 
the owner to construct a building upon the owner's 
property. In order to constitute a lien claimant an 
original contractor, there must exist or have existed a 
contract, either express or implied, between such lien 
Claimant and the owner of the property. One who 
deals with the party in interest who is the source of 
authority for the improvement directly is contracting 
with the owner, and is not a subcontractor, but is an orig-
inal contractor." 
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In 57 CJS Sec. 57 at page 547, Mechanics Liens we 
find the following: 
"Under statutes so providing, the word 'owner' 
includes every person for whose immediate use or 
benefit the building, erection, or improvement is made. 
Some courts, construing such statutes in connection with 
other statutes deem an owner to be a person who owns 
an interest in the land and for whose immediate use 
and benefit the improvement is made." 
and at page 54 7 we find the following: 
"It has been held that the purpose of the statute 
is to enlarge rather than limit the ordinary definition 
of the word 'owner'. Under the latter construction a 
person who owns both the building and the fee is an 
owner regardless of whether or not the improvement is 
made for his immediate benefit." (Italics added) 
As to the term "Contractor" we find at page 602, sec-
tion 90 of the same text it states that as used in mechanics' 
lien statutes the term "contractor" has a restricted meaning. 
A contractor, or principal contractor or original contrator, 
within such statutes, is a person who contracts directly 
with the owner of the property to erect or construct a build-
ing or other structure or improvement or any main division 
or part thereof. 
In Hinckley v. Fields Biscuit & Cracker Co., 91 Cal. 
136, 27 P. 594 it is said: 
"One holding the legal title to land, who enters 
into a contract with the corporation to construct a factory 
thereon under his directions, in consideration of a trans-
fer to him before the erection of the building of a 
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certain number of shares of its capital stock and agrees 
to convey the building after its completion, together with 
the land upon which it stood, to the company, is the 
'owner' of the building and not a contractor within the 
meaning of Code or Civ. Proc. Sec. 1183, relating to 
mechanics' liens." 
And in Grassi v Lovisa, 259 N.Y. 417, 182 NE 68, 
Annotated in 83 ALR 1149 the court held a vendor of land 
who has contracted for a consideration to convey the premises 
to the vendee and thereafter to erect a building thereon, is 
not a contractor for the improvement within the provisions 
of the Mechanics' Lien Law. 
We find from said case the following facts: Sherman 
Square Studios Realty Corporation was the owner of prem· 
ises in New York City. Sherman conveyed to a corporation 
the premises which thereupon began the construction of a 
building. Plaintiff Grassi furnished labor and materials for 
plastering. Defendant Lovisa furnished labor and mate-
rial for marble installation. They and others filed liens. 
The court said: 
"Sec. 2 of the New York Lien Laws says: 'The 
term' contractor when used in this chapter, means a 
person who enters into a contract with the owner of 
real property for the improvement thereof." 
It is to be noted this wording is very similar to our 
Section 38-1-2. 
In the above case the court further said in construing 
this Section: 
"The contractor whom the lien law has in view is 
one who would be so characterized in the common 
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speech of men. He is one who, in the usual course of 
trade has undertaken to improve the property of another. 
On its face, the agreement between Sherman and the 
corporation was not a contract between general con-
tractor and owner, for the corporation, when the con-
tract was signed, did not then own the title to the prem-
ises, nor was it a vendee in possession under a contract 
for the purchase of such real property. On the contrary, 
the contract was one between vendor and purchaser 
whereby, in addition to conveying the property, the 
vendor agreed to make improvements thereupon for the 
benefit and at the expense of the vendee. Thus when 
the contract was made Sherman was still the owner, and 
since it could not contract with itself, could not have 
been a general contractor for the improvement." (Italics 
added) 
The above case is much stronger and goes much further 
than the Court is required to go in the instant case. It ap-
pears that Coon was the fee title owner until April 25th, 1956, 
the date of the deed from Coon to Trimble. 
Fee title was vested in Coon during the whole of the 
period of construction of the improvements. Each of the 
lien claimants designated Coon as owner in their notices of 
liens. 
Coon being the owner with whom appellant contracted, 
appellant was required to file its lien within 80 days from 
its last delivery of materials. Section 38-1-7 UCA 1953 
is mandatory in this requirement. 
The Courts of Utah have so construed the above pro-
vision in Morris v Carey-Lombard Co. 9 Utah p. 70 at page 
76 in which case the court speaking through Mr. Justice 
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Bartch said of the provisions of the act approved March 
I2, I890, Session Laws I890, sections IO and II: 
"Every person claiming a lien must file the state-
ment as provided in this section. This is indispensable 
to preserve the lien provided for in the preceding sec-
tions, and section 11 provides that this statement shall 
be filed within 60 days in case of the principal con-
tractor, and within 40 days in case of a sub-contractor 
in either degree after the time when the last work 
shall have been done or the last material shall have 
been furnished." 
and at page 80 of the same case the court further says: 
"After the work is completed or the materials are 
furnished the lien may be lost by a failure to file the 
statement provided in section IO within the time allowed 
in section II, or by a failure to foreclose within the 
time as limited in this act." 
The above case is cited under our present Section 38-I-7 
UCA I953, subdivision 4 at page 752, and is the law today. 
The only question on this point raised by appellant 
was that Coon was a contractor. The cases above cited 
show as a matter of law that Coon was not a contractor. 
There, therefore, is no genuine issue for trial as to this point. 
II 
WAIVER AND RELEASE 
(a)-Parol Evidence: 
Appellant executed a written release and lien waiver 
for a valuable consideration which provided in part that the 
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executing party "Waives, releases and discharges any lien 
or right to lien the undersigned has or may hereafter acquire 
against said real property." The instrument is unambiguous 
in all respects. Appellant is attempting to vary the terms 
thereof by parol evidence. It is elementary that this cannot 
be done. Appellant would not be in position to introduce 
evidence at a trial that appellant's intent was other and dif-
ferent from the unambiguous language of the written in-
strument. 
20 Am. Ju.r. 964 under the title evidence, Section 1102 
provides: 
"The intention of the parties as evidenced by the 
legal import of the language of the written contract 
cannot be varied by parol proof of a different inten-
tion, in the absence of some equitable ground for in-
tervention, such as mistake, fraud, or surprise. Parol ev-
idence is not admissible to show the intention of a party 
as to the character of an instrument which is so plain 
and unambiguous that its meaning can be ascertained 
from reading it. Hence, testimony of a party to a con-
tract as to how he understood it is inadmissible. Testi-
mony as to what the witnesses understood from conver-
sations with the parties, as to the contract between them, 
cannot be received to contradict the written contract." 
There is a long list of cases cited in support of the above 
proposition including Andrus v. Blazzard, 23 U. 233, 63 P. 
888, 54 L.R.A. 354. 
20 Am. Jur. 973 provides: 
"The admissibility of parol evidence in the case of 
a receipt has been conditioned on ambiguity: the view 
is that if the receipt is definitely descriptive of what i5 
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intended to be affected by it, it cannot be assailed by 
parol testimony except on the ground of fraud." 
"In the absence of fraud or mistake, parol evi-
dence is not admissible to contradict, vary, add to, or 
subtract from the terms of a valid written instrument. 
Fox Film Corp. v. Ogden Theatre Co., Inc., 82 Utah 
279, 17 P 2nd 294, 90 A.L.R. 1299; Last Chance 
Ranch Co. V. Erickson, 82 U. 475, 25 P 2nd 952." 
(b) ESTOPPEL 
In 36 Am. Jur. on Mechanic's Liens, Section 221 under 
the subject of Estoppel we find the following statement: 
"Under the general principles of estoppel, the right 
to a mechanic's lien may be waived or lost by a course 
of conduct on the part of the lien holder which would 
render it inequitable for him to assert a lien." 
at section 230 it is said: 
"A contractor, by agreeing with the owner to keep 
the property free from mechanics' liens, and, a fortiori, 
by agr.eeing to assert no lien, precludes himself from 
claiming a lien, and the right to a lien is not revived by 
the failure of the owner to make payment as agreed." 
In Van Dyck Heating & Plumbing Co. v Central Iowa 
Bldg. Co. 2000 Iowa, 1003, 205 N.W. 650, 102 ALR page 
356, holding that a contractor was not entitled to assert a 
mechanic's lien, the court said: 
"A mechanic's lien is a right or privilege given to 
a contractor to protect himself against loss for material 
and labor furnished. It is wholly a creature of statute. 
We know of no reason, and none has been urged, which 
would prevent the contractor from waiving such a lien. 
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In this instance where, by the contract, the contrator 
waived all liens and claims to liens to which he was 
entitled by statute by reason of work done or to be done. 
The waiver was perfectly clear and unambiguous in 
every respect." 
The above case has been followed In numerous JUris-
dictions. 
In Hyde Park lnv. Co. v Hyde Park State Bank, 257 
Ill. App. 539 it was held that a contractor could not assert 
mechanic's liens where he had executed and delivered for a 
valuable consideration express waivers of liens "on account 
of labor or materials or both furnished or which may he 
furnished." 
And in Kertscher v Oreon 205 NY 522, 99NE 146. 
Ann.Cas. 1913E 561 the court said: 
"No good reason can be suggested why a contractor 
cannot for a valuable consideration, waive the pro-
visions of the statute giving him the right to file a 
notice of lien." 
(c) THE LEGAL EFFECT OF THE LIEN WAIVER ON 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The legal effect of the lien waiver is a genuine issue in 
this case. It is not an issue of fact, however. The facts are 
clear. Appellant cannot seriously contend that parol evi-
dence is admissable to vary the terms of this written instru-
ment by showing that one party to the transaction intended 
that the instrument should not have the legal effect that is 
obvious upon its face. This issue is, therefore, an issue of 
law. The appellant, for a valuable consideration, agreed 
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to waive, release and discharge any lien or right to a lien 
which it had or which it might thereafter acquire. Appellant 
cannot now change the agreement by saying it intended it to 
have a different effect nor can appellant effectively claim that 
by doing so an issue of fact is created. 
The case of Ulibarri V. Christenson, 2 Utah 2nd 367, 
275 P 2nd 170, cited by appellant as authority for its posi-
tion that a summary judgment should not be granted where 
there is a genuine issue of fact, correctly states the law with 
respect to this matter. In that case, motion for summary 
judgment based upon a release was granted even though the 
release was assailed on the grounds of ( 1 ) ambiguity, ( 2) · 
failure of consideration, and ( 3) voidness because of fraud 
and duress, the Court holding there was no genuine issue of 
fact. In this case appellant was given every opportunity 
to show why the lien waiver was not, as respondents contend, 
a waiver of lien right which appellant might thereafter ac-
quire. Appellant's only defense is that it intended that the 
agreement not be a release of lien rights which might be 
acquired in the future contrary to the unambiguous word-
ing of the instrument. Assuming for the moment that de-
fendants actually did so intend, it would not be sufficient 
to change the legal effect of the lien waiver. In sustaining 
the lower Court's order granting summary judgment in the 
Ulibarri V. Christenson case, supra, the Supreme Court at 
page 371 observed: 
"The trial court having afforded the plaintiff a 
fair opportunity to make any representations she could 
which might overcome the release, and having deter-
mined as a matter of law that her claims, even if proved, 
would not meet the legal requisites necessary to do so, 
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he correctly granted the motion for summary judg-
ment." 
The conclusion is inescapable. Appellant waived its 
right to acquire a future lien for services or materials 
furnished on this property. Appellant is estopped and sum-
mary judgment was properly granted against appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
Coon was an owner-builder. The cases cited herein 
show that the law is clear that under our lien law such a 
person is an "owner" and not a "contractor". Apparently 
notice of lien was not, therefore, filed in time. 
Furthermore, if a notice of lien had been filed timely, 
appellant has no lien because appellant executed a release 
for a consideration whereby it "hereby waives, releases and 
discharges any lien or right to lien the undersigned has or 
may hereafter acquire against said real property". 
For both reasons herein stated, respondents should pre-
vail. 
Respectfully submitted, 
M. V. BACKMAN 
JOHN FAR LARSON 
JOHN W. LOWE 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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